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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/905,591	07/13/2001	Keiya Ozawa	50026/012004	4282

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CLARK & ELBING LLP
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BOSTON, MA 02110

EXAMINER

SISSON, BRADLEY L

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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1634

DATE MAILED: 09/16/2005

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary

Application No.

09/905,591

Applicant(s)

OZAWA ET AL.

Examiner

Bradley L. Sisson

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-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 02 March 2005.
- 2a) ☐ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☒ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 7, 18-20 and 34-47 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 7, 18-20 and 34-47 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☒ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
- Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
- Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- 1) ☒ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☒ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
- 6) ☐ Other: _____

S-0-0

DETAILED ACTION

Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114

1. A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114 was filed in this application after appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, but prior to a decision on the appeal. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114 and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the appeal has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114 and prosecution in this application has been reopened pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 02 March 2005 has been entered.

Specification

2. The title of the invention is not descriptive. A new title is required that is clearly indicative of the invention to which the claims are directed.

3. The specification contains numerous bibliographic citations, yet it has not been found to contain any statement that the cited documents have been incorporated by reference. As set forth in *Advanced Display Systems Inc. v. Kent State University* (Fed. Cir. 2000) 54 USPQ2d at 1679:

Incorporation by reference provides a method for integrating material from various documents into a host document--a patent or printed publication in an anticipation determination--by citing such material in a manner that makes it clear that the material is effectively part of the host document as if it were explicitly contained therein. *See General Elec. Co. v. Brenner*, 407 F.2d 1258, 1261-62, 159 USPQ 335, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1968); *In re Lund*, 376 F.2d 982, 989, 153 USPQ 625, 631 (CCPA 1967). **To incorporate material by reference, the host document must identify with detailed particularity what specific material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is found in the various documents.** *See In re Seversky*, 474 F.2d 671, 674, 177 USPQ 144, 146 (CCPA 1973) (providing that incorporation by reference requires a

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statement “clearly identifying the subject matter which is incorporated and where it is to be found”); *In re Saunders*, 444 F.2d 599, 602-02, 170 USPQ 213, 216-17 (CPA 1971) (reasoning that a rejection or anticipation is appropriate only if one reference “expressly incorporates a particular part” of another reference); *National Latex Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co.*, 274 F.2d 224, 230, 123 USPQ 279, 283 (6th Cir. 1959) (requiring a specific reference to material in an earlier application in order to have that material considered a part of a later application); *cf. Lund*, 376 F.2d at 989, 13 USPQ at 631 (holding that **a one sentence reference to an abandoned application is not sufficient to incorporate from the abandoned application into a new application**). (Emphasis added.)

Attention is also directed to MPEP 608.01(p)I, which, in pertinent part, is reproduced below:

Mere reference to another application, patent, or publication is not an incorporation of anything therein into the application containing such reference for the purpose of the disclosure required by 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph. *In re de Seversky*, 474 F.2d 671, 177 USPQ 144 (CCPA 1973). In addition to other requirements for an application, the referencing application should include an identification of the referenced patent, application, or publication. Particular attention should be directed to specific portions of the referenced document where the subject matter being incorporated may be found. (Emphasis added)

Accordingly, the cited documents are not considered to have been incorporated by reference and as such, have not been considered with any effect towards their fulfilling, either in part or in whole, the enablement, written description, or best mode requirements of 35 USC 112, first paragraph.

4. The amendment filed 27 December 2004 and effectively repeated in the letter received 02 March 2005, is objected to under 35 U.S.C. 132(a) because it introduces new matter into the disclosure. 35 U.S.C. 132(a) states that no amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention. The added material that is not supported by the original disclosure is as follows: The change made to page 2 of the disclosure.

5. Applicant is required to cancel the new matter in the reply to this Office Action.

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Response to argument

6. At page 14 of said response applicant's representative asserts that these changes to the specification are corrections to translation errors. Neither the response filed 27 December 2004 nor the response received 02 March 2005 has been found to contain any sworn statement from a certified translator that these errors in fact exist. Attention is directed to MPEP 2145.

Attorney argument is not evidence unless it is an admission, in which case, an examiner may use the admission in making a rejection. See MPEP § 2129 and § 2144.03 for a discussion of admissions as prior art.

The arguments of counsel cannot take the place of evidence in the record. In *re Schulze*, 346 F.2d 600, 602, 145 USPQ 716, 718 (CCPA 1965); In *re Geisler*, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("An assertion of what seems to follow from common experience is just attorney argument and not the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness."). See MPEP § 716.01(c) for examples of attorney statements which are not evidence and which must be supported by an appropriate affidavit or declaration.

With only the argument of counsel to support the basis of the changes, the changes are, in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, deemed to be new matter. Accordingly,

Applicant is required to cancel the new matter in the reply to this Office Action.

Double Patenting

7. Claims 7, 18-20, and 34-47 of this application conflict with claim 9 of Application No. 09/577,084. 37 CFR 1.78(b) provides that when two or more applications filed by the same applicant contain conflicting claims, elimination of such claims from all but one application may be required in the absence of good and sufficient reason for their retention during pendency in more than one application. Applicant is required to either cancel the conflicting claims from all

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but one application or maintain a clear line of demarcation between the applications. See MPEP § 822.

8. The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. See *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and *In re Thorington*, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).

A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent is shown to be commonly owned with this application. See 37 CFR 1.130(b).

Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

9. Claims 7, 34, 40, and 44 are provisionally rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 9 of copending Application No. 09/577,084 as the claims in the instant application is directed to a method of selective proliferation of a cell wherein said cell comprises a fusion protein. In accordance with claim 1 of the '084 application, the fusion protein comprises the cytokine receptor c-mpl. Said receptor is encompassed by the instant claims, which more broadly stipulate that there simply has to be a cytokine receptor present in the fusion protein. It is well settled that a species can render obvious the genus from which it comes. Accordingly, claims 7, 34, 40, and 44 are provisionally rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 9 of copending Application No. 09/577,084.

10. This is a provisional obviousness-type double patenting rejection.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

11. The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

12. Claims 7, 18-20, and 34-47 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter, which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention. Attention is directed to the decision in *University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.* 68 USPQ2D 1424 (Fed. Cir. 2004) at 1428:

To satisfy the written-description requirement, the specification must describe every element of the claimed invention in sufficient detail so that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the inventor possessed the claimed invention at the time of filing. *Vas-Cath*, 935 F.3d at 1563; see also *Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc.*, 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 [41 USPQ2d 1961] (Fed. Cir. 1997) (patent specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that “the inventor invented the claimed invention”); *In re Gosteli*, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 [10 USPQ2d 1614] (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed”). Thus, an applicant complies with the written-description requirement “by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious,” and by using “such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that set forth the claimed invention.” *Lockwood*, 107 F.3d at 1572.

13. A review of the disclosure finds the following examples:
- a. Example 1, “Constructing the chimeric G-CSF receptor/estrogen receptor gene (a selective amplification gene),” pages 9;

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- b. Example 2, "Isolation of Ba/F3 cells into which was introduced the chimeric G0CSF receptor/estrogen receptor gene, which is a selective amplification gene," pages 9-11;
- c. Example 3, "Analysis of cell proliferation by esterdiol," page 11;
- d. Example 4, "Construction of the IRES-CD24 expression plasmid," pages 11-12;
- e. Example 5, "Intracellular expression of CD24," pages 12-13; and
- f. Example 6, "Progenitor assays," pages 13-15.

As can be seen above, none of the examples are directed to the selective proliferation of a cell, e.g., gene therapy, in a mixed/heterogeneous assay. A review of the disclosure fails to find an adequate written description of the reagents used to practice the claimed method. Also not apparent is a written description of the best mode contemplated by applicant for practicing the invention.

14. As applicant's representative as asserted at page 15 of the response, the claims fairly encompass proliferation of virtually any cell, not just blood cells. A review of the specification fails to find the requisite full, clear, and concise description of the invention, which would reasonably suggest that applicant, was in possession of the full genus encompassed by the claims.

15. It appears that applicant is attempting to satisfy the written description requirement of 35 USC 112, first paragraph, through obviousness. Obviousness, however, cannot be relied upon for satisfaction of the written description requirement. In support of this position, attention is directed to the decision in *University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.* (Fed. Cir. 1997) 43

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USPQ2d at 1405, citing *Lockwood v. American Airlines Inc.* (Fed. Cir. 1997) 41 USPQ2d at 1966:

Recently, we held that a description which renders obvious a claimed invention is not sufficient to satisfy the written description requirement of that invention.

For the above reasons, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 7, 18-20, and 34-47 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.

16. Claims 7, 18-20, and 34-47 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter, which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention. As set forth in *Enzo Biochem Inc., v. Calgene, Inc.* (CAFC, 1999) 52 USPQ2d at 1135, bridging to 1136:

To be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without 'undue experimentation.' " *Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S*, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365, 42 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting *In re Wright*, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Whether claims are sufficiently enabled by a disclosure in a specification is determined as of the date that the patent application was first filed, see *Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.*, 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986).... We have held that a patent specification complies with the statute even if a "reasonable" amount of routine experimentation is required in order to practice a claimed invention, but that such experimentation must not be "undue." See, e.g., *Wands*, 858 F.2d at 736-37, 8 USPQ2d at 1404 ("Enablement is not precluded by the necessity for some experimentation . . . However, experimentation needed to practice the invention must not be undue experimentation. The key word is 'undue,' not 'experimentation.' ") (footnotes, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). In *In re Wands*, we set forth a number of factors which a court may consider in determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation. These factors were set forth as follows: (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of

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the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims. *Id.* at 737, 8 USPQ2d at 1404. We have also noted that all of the factors need not be reviewed when determining whether a disclosure is enabling. See *Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd.*, 927 F.2d 1200, 1213, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the *Wands* factors "are illustrative, not mandatory. What is relevant depends on the facts.").

The claimed method clearly relates to the area of gene therapy. While much research has been and is continuing in this area, the art is recognized as being rife with serious issues of enablement. In support of this position attention is directed to the January 14 2003 letter from NIH Director Patterson, M.D., regarding adverse experience with gene therapy in blood cells using cytokine receptors. It is noted that in the nearly seven years since the filing date of the instant application, the ability to effectively treat blood cells, much less a broader genus of cells, in just one life form, has been met with much difficulty, and that the NIH was recommending that the such investigations be "discontinued." Such statements clearly reflect the profound difficulty associated with this area of art. As noted in *In re Fisher* 166 USPQ 18 (CCPA, 1970):

In cases involving predictable factors, such as that, once imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty and their performance characteristics predicted by resort to known scientific laws. In cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and physiological activity, the scope of enablement obviously varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability of the factors involved. (Emphasis added)

17. In view of the breadth of scope claimed, the limited guidance provided, the unpredictable nature of the art to which the claimed invention is directed, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, the claims are deemed non-enabled by the disclosure. Therefore, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 7, 18-20, and 34-47 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement.

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Conclusion

18. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Bradley L. Sisson whose telephone number is (571) 272-0751. The examiner can normally be reached on 6:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

19. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, W. Gary Jones can be reached on (571) 272-0745. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.

20. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).



Bradley L. Sisson
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 1634

BLS
12 September 2005